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Abstract
This note provides an extensive survey of studies estimating steady-state labor supply
elasticities for Western Europe and the US. Di¤erences are driven by the heterogeneity
in work preferences across countries and by methodological di¤erence across studies
(data, selection or model estimation and specication). While the former exists but is
shown to be relatively small (Bargain et al., 2013), we focus here on modeling choices:
Large elasticities are mainly found in studies estimated in the 1980s and relying on the
Hausman approach. More recent estimates based on discrete-choice models with tax-
benet simulations show smaller and more similar estimates across countries. While
we conrm that elasticities decline over time in the US, there is some evidence that
both time e¤ect and modeling choices a¤ect estimates for Europe.
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1 Introduction
Static models of labor supply are very useful to predict ex ante the e¤ect of tax-benet policy
reforms or more generally to provide an order of magnitude of the short-term response to
nancial incentives. Responsiveness is often summarized by a measure of what Chetty et al.
(2011) refer to as "steady-state elasticities", i.e. wage or income elasticities of labor market
participation or worked hours stemming from a static framework. These estimates are useful
in many contexts, for instance to calibrate an optimal tax model, and in principle, they
allow comparing labor supply responses across countries. However, many factors may a¤ect
the di¤erences in the size of elasticities across studies. The variation in magnitude of labor
supply elasticities found in the literature is huge (see Evers et al., 2008), and there is little
agreement among economists on the elasticity size that should be used in economic policy
analyses (Fuchs et al., 1998).
Several excellent surveys report evidence on elasticities for di¤erent countries and di¤erent
periods. Those written in the 1980s mainly focus on estimations using the continuous labor
supply model of Hausman (1981) and provide evidence essentially for individuals in couples
(Hausman, 1985b, Pencavel, 1986, for married men, Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, for
married women). More recent surveys incorporate some evidence from recent methods (see
Blundell andMaCurdy, 1999; Meghir and Phillips, 2008) or focus on life-cycle models (Keane,
2011; Keane and Rogerson, 2012; McClelland and Mok, 2012). Most of these surveys mainly
summarize the available evidence for the US and the UK. Evers et al. (2008) suggest a
meta-analysis based on estimates for di¤erent Western countries, focusing essentially on
those obtained with the traditional Hausman approach.
This note attempts to compare (more) broadly the international evidence on steady-state
labor supply elasticities. We collect old and recent estimates for Europe and the US, cov-
ering the studies based on the Hausman method, more recent ones based on discrete-choice
structural models and, when available, estimates drawn from natural experiments.1 We ac-
knowledge that di¤erences across studies can be driven by di¤erences in work preferences
across countries and by methodological di¤erences (data selection and period of investigation,
1We focus on labor supply decisions (hours and participation). Hence, we ignore the other margins that
are captured in the literature on the elasticity of taxable income (see Meghir and Phillips, 2008, and Saez
et al., 2012, for surveys). Arguably, these other margins partly relate to responses not directly pertaining
to productive behavior, like tax evasion and tax optimization. In this regard, hours of work still constitute
an interesting benchmark. Another margin is work e¤ort that may a¤ect wage rates. In the short run,
however, hours and participation are the only variables of adjustment for a large majority of workers. We
also leave aside the macroeconomic literature, in which elasticities are often obtained by calibration of
general equilibrium models. These elasticities are much larger than in microeconomic studies (e.g., Prescott,
2004). Several reasons have been suggested for this: the use of representative agents and di¢ culties around
aggregation theory when heterogeneity matters (see Blanchard, 2006), the existence of a social multiplier
whereby the utility from not working is increasing in the number of people who do not work (see Alesina
et al., 2005), and factors related to the timing and the nature of labor supply adjustments (Chetty et al.,
2011).
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estimation method and model estimation and specication, etc.). Measuring international
di¤erences in consumption-leisure requires using a uniform approach for many countries.
This exercise, undertaken by Bargain et al. (2013) for the EU and the US, shows that
cross-country variation exists but is relatively small at least smaller than what is expected
from comparing estimates in the literature. In the present companion paper, we therefore
focus on the other sources of di¤erence across studies, namely modeling choices. To do so,
we compare 214 elasticity estimates resulting from 110 estimations, i.e. 86 estimations in 57
studies on married men and women and 24 studies on single individuals (with or without
children).
Our survey substantially completes previous reviews on static labor supply models, which,
as stated above, concentrate mainly on evidence from the Hausman model, for the 1980s and
1990s and for Anglo-Saxon countries. Our results go as follows. First, we broadly conrm the
modest consensus reached in the literature, establishing that own-wage elasticities are largest
for married women, smaller for men. Recent studies conrm these ndings but not negative
elasticities for men as sometimes found in older studies. Estimates for men are generally
positive and small, with some exceptions (for instance Ireland and some German studies).
Some of the studies for the US and the UK, but not all, point to substantial elasticities
for single parents while estimates for childless singles are usually missing. Second, for each
demographic group, we observe a very large variance in estimates across all available studies.
This is partly due to the use of the Hausman approach, which seem to overstate elasticities
compared to what is found with more recent approaches and notably the use of discrete choice
models. The other main methodological factor behind di¤erent estimates is the time period.
For the US, we corroborate the ndings of Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007), who
show, using a uniform approach for di¤erent periods, that married womens wage-elasticities
decline over time. Given that the use of the Hausman method coincides with older studies,
it is nonetheless di¢ cult to disentangle the two factors. Restricting our meta-analysis to
years of common support, we nd evidence in favor of both explanations for Europe. This
means that the results of Heim and Blau and Kahn might be generalized to EU countries.
For the US, there is no clear evidence that estimation methods matter in fact, estimates
from discrete choice modeling are missing for the long period and should be the subject of
future research.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the various empirical approaches.
Section 3 reports the survey results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Methods: A Critical Review
The principal object of examination in this study is the size of wage and income elasticities
stemming from static labor supply models. Responsiveness to nancial incentives in these
models has been identied in various ways. There is no generally agreed-upon standard
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estimation approach and we provide here a brief critical review. A more technical and
comprehensive presentation of these methods and their identication strategies are provided
in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Blundell et al. (2007).
Traditional estimation techniques rely on some functional specication of a labor supply func-
tion and the underlying consumption-leisure preferences. Estimation is then made through
local linearization of the budget constraint, accounting for the fact that after-tax wages
depend on the labor supply choice (Hall, 1973) or using more comprehensive techniques
(Hausman, 1981,1985a, 1985b). The approach relies on cross-section variation in working
hours and in the two main covariates, i.e. the after-tax wage and the virtual income (i.e.
the intercept of the linearized budget constraint). As a result, the main identication issue
is the endogeneity of wages and unearned income, which can be seen as an omitted variable
problem. Indeed, wages may be endogenous because unobservables a¤ecting preferences for
work, e.g., being a hard-working person, may well be correlated with unobservables a¤ecting
productivity and hence wages. Unearned income may be endogenous for similar reasons, i.e.
individuals who work harder because of unobserved preferences for work are also likely to
have accumulated more assets; if unearned income also represents income from the spouse,
positive assortative mating could imply that hard working individuals will tend to marry
similar persons, another reason for the endogeneity issue. Hence, estimates obtained from
cross-sectional variation in wages and nonlabor income across individuals are potentially bi-
ased. Instrumental variables methods have been suggested and the validity of the Hausman
approach hinges on whether the exclusion assumptions of the economic model hold. Also,
estimates are potentially contaminated by measurement errors from the division bias (cf.
Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999). In addition, a series of practical di¢ culties limit the applica-
tion of the method. First, relying on tangency conditions, the Hausman model is mainly
restricted to the case of piecewise linear and convex budget sets, i.e., a partial representation
of the e¤ect of tax-benet policies on household budget constraints. This limitation applies
equally to generalizations of the technique to non-parametric estimations (Blomquist and
Newey, 2002). To account for nonconvexities, as in Hausman (1985b) and Hausman and
Ruud (1984), labor supply must be specied parametrically together with the correspond-
ing direct utility function, which implies rather restrictive forms for preferences (see the
discussion in Van Soest and Das, 2001).2 Second, quasi-concavity of the utility function is
implicitly imposed a priori. As discussed by MaCurdy et al. (1990) and MaCurdy (1992),
the Hausman method thus requires global satisfaction of the Slutsky condition by the labor
supply function for internal consistency of the model, an unnecessary behavioral restriction
2Another approach is the reconvexication of the budget set. For instance, to estimate the labor supply
of married women on 1985 French data, Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) use the Hausman technique and
eliminate minor nonconvexities by replacing the budget set by its convex envelope. This approach is not
possible for later years as the implementation of a minimum income scheme in 1988 has introduced high
nonconvexity in the budget constraint. Similar nonconvexities arise in all countries with substantial means-
tested transfers.
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that may bias estimates (see a modern statement in Heim and Meyer, 2003, and Meghir and
Phillips, 2008). Third, the model makes it di¢ cult to handle joint labor supply decisions
within a couple or participation decisions. Instead of non-participation following simply from
the corner solution of the model, xed costs of work can be introduced, yet this additional
source of nonconvexity has to be dealt with and results seem to be very sensitive to the
model specication (see the discussion in Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990).
Instead of estimating a labor supply function, the discrete choice approach is based on
the concept of random utility maximization (see van Soest, 1995, or Hoynes, 1996, among
others). Thus, it requires the explicit parameterization of consumption-leisure preferences,
for utility to be evaluated at each discrete alternative. Tangency conditions need not be
imposed and the model is in principle very general. Labor supply decisions are reduced
to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities, e.g., inactivity, part-time and full-time.
This solves several problems encountered with the Hausman method. In particular, discrete
choice modeling includes non-participation as one of the options so that both extensive and
intensive margins are directly estimated. The complete e¤ect of the tax-benet system is
easily accounted for, even in the presence of nonconvexities in budget sets. Work costs, which
also create nonconvexities, are dealt with relatively easily. Estimated as model parameters
as in Callan et al. (2009) or Blundell et al. (2000), they usually improve the t of these
models as they account for the fact that very few observations exist with a small positive
number of worked hours. Very few restrictions on preferences need to be imposed in discrete
choice models, notably because xed costs of work cannot be disentangled from preference
parameters, so that it makes no sense to impose the convexity of preferences (see van Soest
et al., 2002, Heim and Meyer, 2003, Bargain, 2009). The only restriction to the model is the
imposition of increasing monotonicity in consumption, which seems a minimum requirement
for meaningful interpretation and policy analysis. Joint labor supply decision for couples
is a straightforward extension of the basic model in the discrete choice setting. Yet, many
applications still treat husbandsworking hours xed at observed levels and focus on the
labor supply of women, i.e. a male chauvinist model (e.g., Bargain, 2009; such treatment
is typical in Hausman models, e.g. Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). The implication of
such separable treatment of spouseslabor supply choices is relatively unknown.
In the discrete choice approach, identication is mainly provided by nonlinearities, non-
convexities and discontinuities in the budget constraint due to tax-benet rules (see the
discussion in Blundell et al., 2007, and Bargain et al., 2013). Precisely, individuals with the
same gross wage usually receive di¤erent net wages. Indeed, as they are characterized by
di¤erent circumstances (di¤erent marital status, age, family compositions, home-ownership
status, disability status) or levels of nonlabor income, their e¤ective tax schedules are dif-
ferent, i.e., di¤erent actual marginal tax rates or benet withdrawal rates. Arguably, some
of the conditioning characteristics (age, children) are also included as preference variables
in the model so that identication is essentially parametric. In practice, some exclusion
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restrictions come naturally. Indeed, tax-benet rules depend on characteristics which are
much more detailed than usual taste-shifters (e.g. benet rules depending on detailed geo-
graphical information while preferences are assumed to depend only on urban versus rural
areas or on whether the household lives in the capital city). Additional, more convincing
sources of exogenous variation are also used in some studies. Closer to the natural experi-
ment method, these consist in time or regional variation in tax-benet rules. For instance, in
the US, variation in income tax rules or in the parameters of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) across states is used in Eissa and Hoynes (2004) or Hoynes (1996). Time variation
in tax-benet rules also provide a better identication when policy reforms occur over the
period under consideration, as discussed, e.g., in Bargain et al. (2013)
A third approach consists in using policy reforms explicitly in order to identify labor sup-
ply responses, without attempting to estimate a structural model (e.g., Eissa and Liebman,
1996). Natural experiments based on important tax-benet reforms in the US and the UK
have been extensively used to identify behavioral parameters (see the survey of Hotz and
Scholz, 2003, for the US). For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) use a di¤erence-and-
di¤erence approach to identify the impact of the EITC reforms on the labor supply of single
mothers. They nd compelling evidence that single mothers joined the labor market in re-
sponse to increased nancial incentives to work. There is less evidence for other countries
and notably for continental Europe so that structural models are still much in use.3 The
timing of response to such policy reforms or policy discontinuity is unclear. Nonetheless,
the implicit model that analysts have in mind when discussing the "next-morning" e¤ect
of the policy impact is often a static one (cf. Lemieux and Milligan, 2008, or Bargain and
Doorley, 2011). This reduced-form approach is increasingly used because natural experi-
ments probably o¤er one of the most credible sources of identication. These studies do not
systematically report wage elasticities, however. They rather report labor supply elasticities
to benet or tax rate changes. Thus, for comparability purposes, we could include only
a few of them in the present survey. Also, the fact that actual reforms notably welfare
reforms in the US and the UK typically a¤ect couples or single women with children makes
that very little evidence is available for other demographic groups, in particular for child-
less single individuals. Regarding identication, the denition of control groups might be
an issue in di¤erence-in-di¤erence approaches. For instance, responses to EITC expansions
a¤ecting single mothers were evaluated using childless women as control group, which may
not be ideal given di¤erent long-term trends in labor supply in the two groups (see Hotz and
3Things are changing in the recent period. For France, for instance, some studies have recently used tax-
benet changes to evaluate the responsiveness of the labor force, including the introduction of a small tax
credit (Stancanelli, 2008), time change in income tax schedule (Carbonnier, 2008), changes in the possibility
to cumulate welfare payment for lone mothers and earnings (González, 2008), and age condition on children
for a replacement income targeted at low-income mothers who opt for full-time childcare (Piketty, 1998).
RD estimations using age conditions on the level of social assistance program are also used in Bargain and
Doorley (2011), in a similar way as Lemieux and Milligan (2008) for Canada.
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Scholz, 2003).4 RD experiments are deemed better in this respect since the nature of indi-
viduals on both sides of the discontinuity is "as good as random" (cf. Lemieux and Milligan,
2008). Finally, a few studies rely on long-term changes in wages as well as on observation
grouping in order to address endogeneity and the problem of measurement error in hourly
wages discussed above (Devereux, 2003, 2004). Blundell et al. (1998) also use tax-benet
policy variation over the long period to identify labor supply responses in the UK. Long-term
variation may pose the problem of assuming that preferences remain stable in the long run,
an issue which is rarely discussed.
3 Static Labor Supply Elasticities: A Survey
We present here existing evidence on labor supply elasticities for European couples (Tables 1
and 2), European single individuals (Table 3) and all demographic groups in the US (Table
4). The reason for this classication is that US studies are more numerous (and hence de-
serve a particular focus) and sometimes consider several demographic groups simultaneously
(e.g. Pencavel, 2002, Devereux, 2003). We distinguish wage-elasticities (total hour and par-
ticipation responses) and income-elasticities. The survey essentially distinguishes between
estimates based on models with a continuous labor supply function (using the Hausman
approach), discrete choice models and grouped estimations / natural experiments. We put
a certain emphasis on the studies based on discrete choice models with taxation, as this
method is increasingly used around the world to analyze the e¤ect of scal and social policy
reforms. Yet we do not pretend to be exhaustive, simply to give a sense of the range of
elasticities obtained in the literature for Europe and the US. Some studies do not report
elasticities and unfortunately could not be included in our tables. This is the case with some
studies using labor supply models (e.g., Hoynes, 1996, does not report wage-elasticities) and
more generally the case with studies using policy reforms as natural experiments, as indi-
cated above (for instance Bingley and Walker, 1997, for the UK, or Eissa and Liebman, 1996,
for the US).
4This issue is shared with the literature on the elasticity of taxable income, whereby results are sensitive
to the type of reforms exploited for identication (Saez et al., 2012). Indeed, control groups denition follows
from their income level, so that specic preferences are identied and results cannot be extrapolated. For
instance, changes in tax rates (tax credits) identify the preferences of high (low) income groups, and may
not be generalized to the whole population.
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3.1 Overview
Figure 1 plots the distribution of wage-elasticity estimates by demographic group.5 The
vertical axis reports the frequency (number of estimates). The rst observation is that
married women is the group with the largest number of available estimates. The second
lesson from these graphs is that in line with conventional wisdom, elasticities are largest
among married women and single mothers, with mean values of :48 and :53 respectively.
These groups also show much dispersion across available studies. Married and single men
(mean value: :11) and childless single women (mean value: :15) show much less variation,
with most estimates between 0 and :30. These conclusions do not change radically if we
look separately at total hour or participation elasticities (detailed results available from the
authors). We now discuss each group specically.
MarriedWomen. Considering Tables 1, 2 and 4, we observe much dispersion in estimates.
This is conrmed in Figure 2 where we plot, for each demographic group, the distribution
of wage-elasticity estimates for each country. The grey triangular indicates the mean value
over all available estimates. Mean elasticities for the UK and the US hide a very broad
dispersion across studies. Large elasticities for France may be driven by methodological
reasons as discussed below. As far as genuine international di¤erences are concerned, we
suggest that larger wage-elasticities prevail in countries where womens participation is low:
This seems to be the case in our survey estimates for Ireland and Italy, which is conrmed
in the discussions in Callan et al. (2009) and Aaberge et al. (2002) for these two countries
respectively. In contrast, womens participation is high in Nordic countries and elasticities
tend to be fairly small there, notably in Finland and Sweden. An exception is Blomquist
and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) for Sweden, but the authors examine data from the 1980s,
while more recent evidence by Flood et al. (2004) conrm small hour elasticities for this
country. Comparing Italy and Norway/Sweden, Aaberge et al. (1999) show that lower
participation rates among married women in Italy leads to a larger potential for reforms that
increase nancial incentives to work. Larger elasticities coincides with more intermittent
labor force participation patterns in Southern countries and Ireland as opposed to more
consistent participation and more constant hours in Scandinavian countries. Apart from
these extreme cases, di¤erences across EU countries, and notably countries of Continental
Europe, may not be very large, as suggested by Evers et al. (2008). This is conrmed by
Bargain et al. (2013): Using an harmonized framework for 17 EU countries and the US, they
nd estimates for married women ranging in a narrow interval :2  :6. This is indeed where
mean values lie in Figure 2 (top left quadrant), with few exceptions. As argued above, direct
comparisons across studies are muddled by methodological di¤erences (notably the period
5All gures reported in this study are based on the estimates of wage elasticities from Tables 1-4. For
comparability purpose, we exclude estimates based on model without taxation, based on long term wage
variation or with too specic selection (e.g. estimates on couples with children only, as in Choné et al.,
2003). We lose 15 estimates, i.e. around 10% of our sample.
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of investigation and the estimation approach). We investigate this point in more detail in
the next sub-section.
Single Mothers. Most studies on single mothers are available for the UK (see Tables 3)
and, to a lesser extent, for the US and Sweden. This demographic group has received much
attention in the literature because of its importance for welfare analysis, given its higher risk
of poverty, and because single parent families were primarily concerned by reforms like tax
credit extensions in the US (cf. Hotz and Scholz, 2003) or the UK (Blundell et al., 2000).
This group is found to be more responsive to nancial incentives than the average, at least
in the UK, the US and Sweden. This is conrmed in Tables 3 and 4, where relatively large
elasticities are shown in several studies but not all. Similar to the result for married women,
much variance is found across studies, as illustrated in Figure 2 (bottom right quadrant).
Moderate estimates are found in some studies for the UK (Blundell et al., 1992) and the
US (Dickert et al., 1995) while other studies point to much larger elasticities (e.g., Keane
and Mo¢ tt, 1998, for the US or many of the British studies). Importantly, the size of
this group has become much larger in the recent period in Anglo-Saxon countries, which
implies possible changes in the selection e¤ects. That is, this group may be less negatively
selected in terms of labor market participation in the recent period. For the US, Bishop et
al. (2009) study all single women over a long period (1979-2003), using a simple estimation
of hours and participation on repeated cross-sections. They report a signicant decline in
hour wage-elasticities over the period and relatively small elasticities in the recent years (at
least compared to typical estimates for married women).
Married Men and Childless Singles Individuals. There is a long history of estimating
male labor supply (see surveys of Hausman, 1985b, and Pencavel, 1986, for married men).
Estimates of wage-elasticities for this group are usually very small, often not signicant and
sometimes negative. There are few exceptions, with larger elasticities in Ireland and in some
of the German studies, as seen in Tables 1 and 2 for married men. Evidence for childless
single men and women, gathered in Table 3, is very limited, despite the growing proportion
of this demographic group in the population. Limited evidence is essentially explained by
methodological reasons. First, estimates are usually more precise for couples or single moth-
ers than for childless single individuals. This can be due to the fact that there is less variation
in labor market behavior among childless singles or that non-participation corresponds more
often to demand-side constraints (rather than to voluntary choice) in their case. This argu-
ment equally applies to single men yet the t of labor supply model for married men should
be overall better when male and female decisions are jointly estimated. Second, estimates
stemming from natural experiments are also limited for this group, given the fact that most
welfare reforms in Anglo-Saxon countries concerned individuals or households with children
(see the discussion in Bargain and Doorley, 2011). The few available estimates point to very
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small elasticities.6 For both men (married or single) and childless single women, estimates
are not only small but very concentrated across studies with countries. This small variance
is illustrated in Figure 2 (top right quadrant for men and bottom left quadrant for childless
single women). Nonetheless, these mean values may hide much variaton in participation
responses across di¤erent wage or income levels, with important implications for welfare
analysis as suggested by see Eissa and Liebman (1996) and conrmed for single individuals
in Bargain et al. (2013).
Income Elasticities. Most studies show negative income elasticities, i.e. positive income
elasticities of non-market time. Yet, despite being at odds with theory, positive income
elasticities are encountered in some studies, which include Kuismanen (1997) for Finland,
Flood and MaCurdy (1992) for Sweden, van Soest (1995) for the Netherlands and Blau and
Kahn (2007) and Cogan (1981) for the US. Also, despite being generally small, income elas-
ticities vary across countries. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report that variation between
studies regarding income elasticity appears to be greater than the corresponding variation
with respect to wage elasticities. This is not conrmed in the extensive study by Bargain et
al. (2013).
3.2 Year of Observation and Estimation Methods
In Tables 1-4 and Figures 1-2, we have observed lots of variation across studies in the size
of wage-elasticities for married women and single mothers. This may correspond to genuine
international di¤erences in preferences. Using a uniform approach, Bargain et al. (2013)
show that cross-country variation is small, however. Therefore, most of the heterogeneity
across studies must be driven by various methodological choices and in particular the period
of observation and the estimation method. We focus on these aspects hereafter, looking at
the two groups showing most variation across studies, namely married women and single
mothers.
Time Trend. In Figure 3, we plot estimates by data year. A very clear declining trend
emerges, showing in particular a concentration of low elasticities in the recent periods (year
2000s). The left quadrant shows for all countries that this pattern is especially driven by
married women, while the trend is not so strong among single mothers. Therefore, in the right
quadrant, we focus on married women and now distinguish between EU and US estimates.
The trend is similar in both regions, with a strong negative correlation between the period
of observation and the elasticity level. These ndings tend to corroborate the result of Heim
(2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007), who show that the labor supply elasticity of married
6For instance, Euwals and Van Soest (1999) report wage elasticities for childless single individuals in the
Netherlands of around :10   :11. For Germany, a series of studies report estimates between :10 and :36 for
childless single men and women.
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has strongly declined over time in the US, and extend it to EU countries. We also nd
similar results when looking separately at hour wage-elasticities (correlation of  :63) and
participation wage-elasticities (correlation of  :54). Yet, results in Heim (2007) and Blau
and Kahn (2007) rely on a uniform approach for the di¤erent periods while our meta-analysis
possibly mixes time e¤ects (including selection e¤ects) and changes in estimation methods
over time.
Estimation Methods. To investigate this point further, let us get back to survey tables 1-
4. A rst observation is that early evidence using the Hausman technique points to relatively
large own-wage elasticities for married women, sometimes close to 1, or even larger, for
instance in early studies for France, Germany, Italy or the UK. In contrast, recent evidence
based on discrete-choice models shows more modest elasticities for this demographic group,
in a range between :1 and :5, with some exceptions. In Table 4, we observe a similar
pattern for the US, with very large estimates in early studies, including Hausman (1981),
and more modest and comparable elasticities in the recent studies (hour elasticities ranging
between :2 and :4). Hence, we can conjecture that the estimation method explains time
di¤erences. With the Hausman approach, the combination of restrictive functional forms
(linear labor supply) and estimation methods that impose theoretical consistency of the
labor supply model everywhere in the sample (global satisfaction of Slutsky conditions)
can lead to biased estimates and possibly an overstatement of work incentives, as discussed
above. Mroz (1987) also shows how the wage e¤ects of married womens labor supply varies
dramatically depending on whether and how one controls for nonrandom selection into work
as well as to alternative exclusion restrictions in the instrument set for wages. Bourguignon
and Magnac (1990) discuss the sensitivity of their results to the model specication and
show that the Hausman approach can lead to implausibly high elasticity values, as they nd
in some of their specications. Drawn from our Table, we can see for instance that married
womens wage elasticity obtained with the Hausman approach vary from :28 (Triest, 1990)
to :97 (Hausman, 1981) in the US, even when similar periods are considered (1983 and
1975 in these two studies respectively). For France, estimates for married women are also
very high with the basic Hausman model, but almost zero when introducing xed costs
(cf. Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990). Estimates obtained with discrete choice models are
somewhat more comparable from one study to the next. Yet there are still di¤erences, which
are more likely driven by selection criteria (for France, high elasticities are found for families
with children in Choné et al., 2003).
Meta-Analysis. To clarify whether the conjecture is true, we plot time trends according
to two broad modeling choice in Figure 3 (upper panels), namely estimates obtained with
continuous models (which rely mainly on the Hausman approach for identication) and those
from discrete-choice models (as recently used in many policy papers). We rst consider
trends obtained with the continuous model. For our group of interest, and whether single
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mothers are included or not, the time shrinking elasticity hypothesis is veried over all
estimates relying on the Hausman approach. When di¤erentiating between regions (Figure
3, lower panels), the meta-analysis corroborates the nd in Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn
(2007) for the US (both studies relying on a Hausman-type approach). A similar pattern is
found for EU estimates but it is noticeable that there are very few estimates based on the
Hausman model for the period after 1990, so the result is more fragile than for the US.7
Then, we consider estimates from discrete choice model estimations. We rst observe the
lack of clear pattern in this case. There is nonetheless a negative linear correlation ( :36
for married women) between years and estimates due to the high density of low estimates
after the end of the 1990s. The correlation becomes positive if we focus on the years before
1998 (+:31). This does not mean that the two main modeling strategies have opposite
conclusions. In fact, there is a clear lack of common support (years) between the two,
essentially due to the fact that very few estimates based on discrete models are available
for the early period. If the shrinking elasticity trend is driven by a change in preferences
(and correlated with an increase female labor market participation) precisely between the
1970s/1980s and the 1990s/2000s, then it cannot be captured by the available estimates
based discrete choice modeling.8 Finally, we restrict our sample to years equal or above the
data year corresponding to the rst estimate obtained with a discrete model (estimates on
CPS 1985 in Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, and on the Dutch Labor Mobility Survey in van Soest
et al., 1990). Thus we can conduct a meta regression over the years for which estimates with
both discrete and continuous models are available. We regress estimates for married women
on a set of model characteristics. Results are reported in Table 5. The main conclusion is that
both years and modeling choice matter. An additional year decreases female elasticities by
around :02 while using the discrete approach reduces female elasticities by around :27. The
overestimation due to the Hausman model is particularly strong for participation elasticities
and for EU estimates.9 We do not report a similar estimation for the US only, given the
small number of observations in this case. Yet it transpires from such regression and the
graphs discussed above that only the time e¤ect matter in the US.10 Notice that using desired
rather than observed hours inate hour elasticites, which may reect constraints on working
time. So does modeling joint decision in couples rather than estimating married womens
7Figure 3 (bottom left quadrant) is actually obtained when taking out the outlier estimate of participation
elasticities by García and Suárez (2003) for Spain. When including it, the pattern is U-shaped rather than
monotonically decreasing (using quadratic trend curves instead of standard trend lines).
8This calls for further research comparing methods over the long run, i.e. a replication of Heim (2007)
and Blau and Kahn (2007) using the discrete model.
9This is illustrated by example of France given above. Note that we have checked that results are not
driven by particular outliers like the implausibly high values for some studies, as mentionned above.
10Note that recent period estimates are very similar whether they stem from grouped estimations (Dev-
ereux, 2004), natural experiments (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004) or structural models (Heim, 2009). As already
discussed in footnote 8, additional estimates using discrete choice models, and for many years including the
older period, should be produced.
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labor supply separately (a male chauvinistic model). None of these two e¤ects is statistically
signicant, however.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an extensive survey of studies estimating labor supply elasticities
for Western Europe and the US. Beyond conrming conventional wisdom, we derive original
results concerning the variation in labor supply estimates across studies. While Bargain et
al. (2013) show that international heterogeneity in work preference matters but is small,
we investigate here the role of two major methodological di¤erences across studies, i.e time
period and estimation methods, that explain di¤erences. Large elasticities are mainly driven
by studies estimated in the 1980s and relying on the Hausman approach. More recent esti-
mates based on structural discrete-choice models with tax-benet simulations show smaller
estimates and relatively more similarity across studies. More points of observations are how-
ever needed to disentangle the two factors, i.e. possibly larger elasticities in the 1970s/1980s
related to lower female participation on the one hand and overestimations due to the Haus-
man model on the other. Our meta-analysis nonetheless allows us to conclude the following:
While we conrm that elasticities decline over time in the US, there is some evidence that
both time e¤ects and modeling choices a¤ect estimates in Europe. Time e¤ects, and notably
declining elasticities over time in the US, are to some extent consistent with cross-country
comparisons, i.e. the fact that countries with more rmly established female participation,
elasticities are smaller (Bargain et al., 2013).
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Table 1: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Couples
hours particip. hours particip. female
Austria Dearing et al. (2007) SILC (2004), at least 1 child aged <10 D QU; M ITABENA [.07, .19] @
Belgium Orsini (2007, 2012) Panel Survey of Belgian Households
(2001),  working age
D QU and GU + PTD; J MODETE [.16, .31] [.10, .19] [.10, .18] [.08, .15]
Finland Kuismainen (1997) LFS (1989), survey & tax register; 25-60 C SL, R PL [0, .06] [.11, .27]
Bargain & Orsini (2006) IDS (1998), working age, men all
employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.10, .18] [.10, .17]*
France Bourguignon & Magnac (1990) LFS (1985), couples aged 18-60 C/T LL + R; M or J PL, D 1 (.05 with
FC)
.10 -.03 (-.02
with FC)
Laroque & Salanie (2002) matched LFS-Tax returns (1999),
women aged 25-49
D joint particip. & wage;
unempl. & min. wage
own calc. (.96) / -.11*
Choné, Le Blanc & Robert-
Bobée (2003)
matched LFS-Tax returns (1997),
working age, children aged <6
D QU, joint wage & CC;
min. wage
own calc. 1.05 [.8, .9] @ -.19 / -.18*
Bargain & Orsini (2006) HBS (1994/5), working age women,
men all employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.52, .65] [.46, .58]*
Donni & Moreau (2007) HBS (2001), aged 20-60, all employed,
no children aged<3
C QL; s-conditional
collective LS
no taxation [.24, .59] [-.35, -.06]
Germany Kaiser et al. (1992) SOEP (1983), working age C LL C, NC, D 1.04 -.04 -.18
Bonin, Kempe & Schneider
(2002)
SOEP (2000), working age, W & E D TL + PTD; J IZAmod .27 .20 .21 .19 .15 / .09
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) SOEP (2002), working age, W & E D TU + PTD; J STSM [.16, .55] @ [.07, .21] @ [.11, .38] @ [.07, .23] @
Haan & Steiner (2004) SOEP (2002), working age, W & E, one-
or two-earner couples
D TU + PTD; J STSM [.08, .56] [.04, .20] [.08, .46] [.07, .26]
Bargain & Orsini (2006) SOEP (1998), working age, men all
employed, W & E
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.31, .45] [.27, .38]*
Clauss & Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/5), couples aged 20-65 D TU; J STSM .37 .14 .24 .16
Wrohlich (2006) SOEP (2002), working age, W & E D TU; J; CC STSM [.14, .53] @ [.06, .16] @
Dearing et al. (2007) SOEP (2004), at least 1 child aged <10,
W
D QU; M STSM [.13, .24] @
Bargain et al. (2009) SOEP (2003), working age, potential one-
or two-earner
D/H QU + PTD, R; J STSM [.19, .34] [.08, .20] [.05, .08] [.04, .13]
Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, W & E,
potential one- or two-earner
D TU+PTD;J FiFoSiM 0.38 0.15 0.20 0.14
Elasticities: brackets indicate the range of values for all specifications (or the confidence interval when available). '@ indicates that the range also includes values for different age and number of children. Particip. =
participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in employment rate in % points, except when indicated by * (in that case, % increase in employment rate).
Data: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS), EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (SILC). For Germany: West (W), East (E).
Model: C = continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981 type); T = tobit model; D = discrete-choice model (van Soest 1995 type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities
vary across individuals);  H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment).
Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL) or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU) or generalized Stone-Geary (GU); random
preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well additional flexibility, either through fixed costs (FC) or part-time dummies (PTD). Models are male-chauvinistic (M) or account for joint decision in couples (J).
Welfare programme participation (W). Childcare costs (CC).
Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C); nonconvexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget function can be
used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the microsimulation model when it is known.
Model SpecificationCountry Authors Data selection Tax-benefit
Income elast.Female wage elast. Male wage elast.
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Table 2: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Couples (cont.)
hours particip. hours particip. female male
Ireland Callan & van Soest (1996) IDS (1987), desired hours D/H TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.50, .85] .31 /.20* [.10, .20]
Callan, van Soest & Walsh
(2009)
Living in Ireland Survey (1995), desired
hours
D TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.71, .90] .49 [.21, .31] .20 /.21*
Italy Colombino & Del Boca
(1990)
Turin Survey of Couples (1979), working
age
C LL PL 1.18 .64 .52
Aaberge et al. (1999) Survey of Income and Wealth (1987), aged
20-70
A non-linear hours, exog.
wage and unearned inc.
own calc. .74 .65 .053 .046 / -.014 / -.003
Aaberge et al. (2002, 04) Survey of Income and Wealth (1993) A GU; J own calc. .66 .51 .12 .02
Netherlands van Soest et al. (1990) Labor mobility survey (1985), working age C/D LL, R; discrete wage-hours
combinations
PL [.35, .59] .12 [.15, .19] -.23 -.01
van Soest (1995) SOEP (1987) D TU + PTD, R; J own calc. [.42, .54] - [.05, .09] - .008 -.03
van Soest & Das (2001) SOEP (1995), aged 16-64, desired hours D TU + FC, R; J own calc. [.67, .74] - [.07, .10] -
van Soest et al. (2002) Dutch SOEP (1995), aged 16-64, desired
hours
D QU (+ more flexible) +
FC, R; simult. wage
estimation, J
own calc. [.83, 1.36] [.35, .58]*
Spain García and Suárez (2003) ECHP (1994-95), aged 16-65, obs. and
desired hours
C LL taxes .37 1.51* -.06
Fernández-Val (2003) ECHP (1994-99), aged<65 and in work C unitary/collective model no taxation .31
Crespo (2006) ECHP (1994-99), aged<65 and in work C QL, unitary/collective no taxation .14 .01
Labeaga, Oliver & Spadaro
(2008)
ECHP (1995), working age
D
QU + FC; J GLAD-
HISPANIA
.29 .26 .01 .11
Sweden Blomquist (1983) Level of Living Survey (1974), all
employed, aged 25-55
C LL, R PL .008 -.03
Flood & MaCurdy (1992) Household Market-Nonmarket Survey
(1983), all employed, 25-65
C LL and SL, R PL, D [.-.25, .21] [.-.01, .04]
Blomquist & Hansson-
Brusewitz (1990)
Level of Living Survey (1981), all
employed, aged 25-55
C LL and QL, R PL, C and NC [.38, .77] [.08, .13] [-.24, -.03]
Blomquist & Newey (2002) Level of Living Survey (1973, 80, 90), all
employed, aged 18-60
C non-parametric labor
supply
PL [.04, .12} -.02
Flood, Hansen & Wahlberg
(2004)
Household Income Survey (1993), aged 18-
64 D
TU, R; stigma of W own calc. .12 0 -0.017 -0.003
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data, Income
Distribution Survey, 1999
D TU, R FASIT .18 .15 .06 0
UK Arellano & Meghir (1992) British FES and LFS (1983), aged 20-59,
with pre-school children (upper bound for
all children)
C SL + FC, search costs,
endogenous wage and
unearned income (IV)
PL [.29, .71] - [-.13, -.40]
Arrufat & Zabalza (1986) British General Household Survey (1974),
aged <60
C CES utility based labor
supply, R
PL [.62 - 2.03] 1.41 -.2 / -.14
Blundell & Walker (1986) FES (1980), all employed, aged 18-59 C Gorman polar form and
translog hours, R
PL .024 -.287
Blundell, Ham &  Meghir
(1987)
FES (1981), aged 16-60 T/H non-linear labor supply,
unemployment risk
own calc. [.04, .08]
Blundell, Duncan & Meghir
(1998)
FES (1978-1992), 20-50, young children
(lower bound if no child)
C generalized LES, R PL [.13, .37] @ - [-.19, 0] @
Blundell et al. (2000) Family Resources Survey (1994-96) D QU + FC, R, W TAXBEN [.11 - .17]
Note: see previous table. For Spain, several additional references are cited in García and Suárez (2003) which point to similar elasticities as in the basic model in this study.
Model SpecificationCountry Author Data selection Tax-benefit
Income elast.Female wage elast. Male wage elast.
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Table 3: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Single Individuals
hours particip.
Finland Bargain & Orsini (2006) IDS (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.18, .34] [.18, .33]
France Bargain & Orsini (2006) HBS (1994/5), aged 25-49, SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.08, .14] [.04, .07]
Laroque & Salanie (2002) LFS-Tax return matched dataset (1999),
women aged 25-49, no civil servants,
SW
D participation (and full/part-time) model,
simultaneous wage and labor supply estimation,
probability of unemployment, min. wage
own calc. {.36}
Germany Bargain & Orsini (2006) SOEP (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.09, .18] [.08, .15]
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) SOEP (2003), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.20, .36] [.05, .09]
Haan & Steiner (2004) SOEP (2002), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.02, .24] [.01, .10]
SM [.08, .31] [.04, .28]
Clauss & Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/5), aged 20-65, SW D STSM .38 .18
SM .23 .17
Bargain et al. (2009) SOEP (2003),  working age, SW D/H STSM [.06, .16] [.04, .10]
SM [.10, .20] [.05, .12]
Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, SW D TU + PTD FiFoSiM 0.28 0.13
SM 0.28 0.17
Italy Aaberge et al. (2002) Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (1993), SW
A own calc. .10 .06
SM .11 .08
Netherlands Euwals & Van Soest (1999) Dutch SOEP (1988), actual and desired
hours, SW
D own calc. [.03, .45]
SM [.03, .18]
Sweden Andren (2003) HINK (1997-98), SP D QU + FC; simulat. with W and CC own calc. [ .55, .87] .50 -0.1
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data, IDS, 1999,
SP
D TU, R FASIT .51 .35
UK Walker (1990) FES (1979-84), SP D participation model benefits only .70
Ermisch & Wright (1991) General household survey (1973-82), SP D participation model, demand-side
controls
simplified system 1.7
Jenkins (1992) Lone parents survey (1989), SP D+H two positive hour choices,
unemployment risk, FC
benefits only 1.8
Blundell, Duncan & Meghir
(1992)
FES (1981-1986), SP C marginal rate of substitution function,
endogenous wage and income
taxation only .34
Brewer et al. (2006) FES (1995-2002), aged <60, SP D QU + FC, joint with W and CC, R TAXBEN 1.02
TU + FC, R
TU + PTD
QU + PTD; involuntary unemployment
Elasticities: brackets indicate the range obtained in function of the specification at use, or the confidence interval when available. Particip. = participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in
employment rate in percentage points.
Model: C = continuous LS (Hausman 1981 type); T = tobit model; D = discrete model (van Soest, 1995 type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities
vary across individuals); H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment).
Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL) or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU) or generalized Stone-Geary
(GU); random preferences (R); fixed costs (FC); welfare participation (W); childcare costs (CC)
Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C); nonconvexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget
function can be used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the microsimulation model when it is known.
Data & Selection: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS); Selection: single
women (SW), single men (SM), single parents/mothers (SP)
GU
income
elast.
wage elasticites
Country Author Data selection Model Specification Tax-benefit
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Table 4: Labor Supply Elasticities for the US
hours particip. hours particip. female male
Cogan (1981)
US National Longitudinal Study of
Mature Women 1967, married
women aged 30-35
C SL; reservation hours to account for FC; notax-benefit [.86 , 2.40] [.16 , .66]
Hausman (1981) PSID 1975, married women C LL, PL (C and NC: FC) [.90 , 1.00] [-.13 , -.12]
Triest (1990) PSID 1983, married women, aged25-55 C LL; C and PL; taxes and benefits [.03 , .28] [-.15 , -.19]
MaCurdy, Green &
Paarsch (1990)
PSID 1975: married men, aged 25-
55 C
LL; PL and D (reconvexified) budget set;
taxes [-.24, .03] -.01
Dickert, Houser and
Scholz (1995) SIPP 1990, single mothers, no assets D joint program and labor force participation .35
Pencavel (1998) CPS 1975-94, women aged 25-60 C Log-L; no tax-benefit [.77,.1.80]
Hoynes (1996) SIPP panel, 1984, married men andwomen with children D
Stone-Geary; stigma from AFDC; tax-
benefit system; FC - .46 - .12
Keane and Moffitt
(1998) 1994 SIPP, single mothers, no assets D
joint labor supply and welfare program
participation; benefits but no tax .96
Pencavel (2002) CPS 1999, married and single men C LL; no tax-benefit [.12,.25]
Devereux (2003) Census and PSID, all men C Log-L, no tax-benefit [–.022, .017] [–.061, .001]
Devereux (2004) PUMS 1980,1990, married couples(participating men) C Log-L, no tax-benefit [.17,.38] [.00,.07]
Eissa & Hoynes (2004) CPS 1985 to 1997, less educatedmarried couples with children D Participation Probit, joint estimation 0.27 .03 -.039 -.007
Blau & Kahn (2007) CPS 1980, married men and womenage 25-54 C Log-L [.77,.88] [.01,.07] .004 .001
CPS 1990 C Log-L [.58,.64] [.10,.14] .002 .002
CPS 2000 C Log-L [.36,.41] [.04,.10] .001 .002
Heim (2009) PSID 2001, couples quadratic utility with continuous laborsupply, J, FC, R [.24,.33] [.07,.18] [.04,.07] [.00,.003] [-.007, -.006]
[-.0007,-
.0004}
Bishop et al. (2009) CPS, 1979-2003, sing. women SL, participation, some account for tax .14 (1979) to -.03 (2003)
.28 (1979) to
.22 (2003)
-.014 (1979) to -
.019 (2003)
Heim (2007) CPS, 1979-2003, married women SL, participation, some account for tax .36 (1979) to.14 (2003)
.66 (1979) to
.03 (2003)
-.05 (1979) to -
.015 (2003)
Male wage elast.
Authors Data selection Model
Elasticities: brackets indicate ranges of values over different specifications, or reported confidence intervals. Participation elasticities ("particip"): increase in employ. rate in % points.
Income elast.
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS), Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
Model: C= continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981 type); D= discrete-choice model (often a simple participation probit)
Specification: Hausman labor supply is either linear (LL), log-linear (Log-L) or semi-log (SL); random preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well as fixed costs (FC). Models sometimes account for
piecewise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C) or nonconvexities (NC), and differentiable budget constraint (D).
Specification
Female wage elast.
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Table 5: Meta Regression of Married Womens Wage-Elasticities
Model
year -0.016 ** -0.021 ** -0.023 *** -0.013
(.007) (.010) (.008) (.008)
discrete model -0.274 ** -0.675 *** -0.096 -0.347 **
(.129) (.234) (.138) (.158)
desired hours 0.151 -0.014 0.178 0.183
(.116) (.180) (.129) (.127)
joint decision 0.022 -0.006 0.139 -0.009
(.092) (.133) (.111) (.102)
fixed cost # 0.032 -0.058 0.107 0.042
(.082) (.120) (.094) (.086)
US -0.202 * -0.454 ** 0.056
(.126) (.194) (.147)
constant 0.771 *** 1.289 *** 0.601 *** 0.809 ***
(.128) (.265) (.121) (.145)
Nb of observations 56 26 30 49
R2 0.20 0.31 0.33 0.19
# for discrete models
All elasticities Participationelasticities Hour elasticities Without the US
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